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COMMENT
LIABILITY OF LANDLORD FOR PERSONAL INJURY DUE
TO INADEQUATE OR LACK OF LIGHTING IN COMMON
AREAS
When a landlord leases a part of the premises to individual tenants,
as in an apartment building, he necessarily retains control over areas
used in common and must exercise ordinary care to keep these areas in
a reasonably safe condition.' This duty arises because common areas
are part of the estate reserved by the landlord for the use and benefit
of all the tenants.2 The responsibility of the lessor extends to the lessee,
members of the lessee's family, and all persons on the premises at the
invitation of the lessee, whether the invitation be express or implied.3
The lessor's obligation extends to hallways,4 stairs,5 elevators,' ap-
'Tissue v. Volta, 254 F.2d 88 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Harris v. Joffe, 28 Cal. 2d 418, 170
P.2d 454 (1946); Mertz v. Krueger, 58 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1952); Mason v. Lieberman,
349 Mass. 321, 208 N.E.2d 222 (1965); Graeber v. Anderson, 237 Minn. 20, 53 N.r.2d
642 (1952); Bluestein v. Scoparino, 277 App. Div. 534, 100 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1950);
Bowser v. Artman, 363 Pa. 388, 69 A.2d 836 (1949); Paytan v. Rowland, 208 Va. 24,
155 S.E.2d 36 (1967); Miller v. Hancock, [1893] 2 Q.B. 177.
This principle is sometimes denominated as the "common use rule." Fitzpatrick v.
Ford, 372 S.W.2d 844 (Mo. 1963).
It has been held that the doctrine that the landlord is "deemed to be in control"
applies also to the space between floors of an apartment house. Fleischer v-. Dworsky,
90 Misc. 628, 153 N.Y.S. 951 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
2 See United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. Paine, 26 F.2d 594 (1st Cir. 1928); Reiman v.
Moore, 42 Cal. App. 2d 130, 108 P.2d 452 (1940); Pickford v. Abramson, 84 N.H. 446,
152 A. 317 (1930); Wool v. Lamer, 112 Vt. 431, 26 A.2d 89 (1942); Schedler v.
Wagner, 37 Wash. 2d 612, 225 P.2d 213 (1950).
3 See, e.g., Coupe v. Platt, 172 Mass. 458, 52 NE. 526 (1899).
4 See, e.g., Temple v. Congress Square Garage, Inc., 145 Me. 274, 75 A.2d 459
(1950).
5See Dixon v. Wootton, 307 Ky. 338, 210 S.W.2d 967 (1948); Chalfen v. Kraft, 324
Mass. 1, 84 NE.2d 454 (1949); Ross v. Belzer, 199 Md. 187, 85 A.2d 799 (1952);
West v. Hanley, 73 S.D. 540, 45 N.W.2d 455 (1950); Andrews v. McCutcheon, 17
Wash. 2d 340, 135 P.2d 459 (1943).
6See Lee v. Jerome Realty, Inc., 338 Mass. 150, 154 N.E.2d 126 (1958); Swenson v.
Slawik, 236 Minn. 403, 53 N.W.2d 107 (1952); Bosze v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
I N.J. 5, 61 A.2d 499 (1948); Carter v. United Novelty & Premium Co., 389 Pa. 198,
132 A.2d 202 (1957).
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proaches and entrances, 7 yards,8 basements,9 bathrooms,'0 common
rooms,"1 porches,' 2 the roof of the building,'3 and any other parts of the
premises maintained for the benefit of the lessee within the purposes
of the lease. 4 However, the landlord is not liable for injuries not rea-
sonably anticipated,'3 or as a result of conditions not discoverable by
reasonable inspection, 1 or those created by a tenant or third party.'
A landlord of rented premises is not required under common law
principles to maintain adequate lighting in those portions of his prem-
ises over which he has retained control for the common use of his
tenants,'" and he is not, in such instances, liable for personal injuries
7See Trimble v. Spears, 182 Kan. 406, 320 P.2d 1029 (1958); Siegel v. Detroit City
Ice & Fuel Co., 324 Mich. 205, 36 N.W.2d 719 (1949); Lunde v. Citizens Nat'l Bank,
213 Minn. 278, 6 N.W.2d 809 (1942); Ross v. Heberling, 92 Ohio App. 148, 109 N.E.2d
586 (1952); Arnold v. Walters, 203 Okla. 503, 224 P.2d 261 (1950).
8 See generally Lake v. Emigh, 121 Mont. 87, 190 P.2d 550 (1948); Hussey v. Long
Dock R.R., 100 N.JL. 380, 126 A. 314 (Ct. Err. & App. 1924); Reek v. Lutz, 90 R.I.
340, 158 A.2d 145 (1960); cf. Rosmo v. Amherst Holding Co., 235 Minn. 320, 50
N.W.2d 695 (1951) (alleyway).
9See Wright & Taylor, Inc. v. Smith, 315 S.W.2d 624 (Ky. 1958); McNab v.
Wallin, 133 Minn. 370, 158 N.W. 623 (1916).
' See Iverson v. Quam, 226 Minn. 290, 32 N.W.2d 596 (1948); Lennox v. White,
133 W. Va. 1, 54 S.E.2d 8 (1949).
" See, e.g., Plimus v. Bellevue Apartments, 241 Iowa 1055, 44 N.W2d 347 (1950).
12 See Klahr v. Kostopoulos, 138 Conn. 653, 88 A.2d 332 (1952); Hinthorn v.
Benfer, 90 Kan. 731, 136 P. 247 (1913).
Is See Madison Ave., Inc. v. Allied Bedding Mfg. Co., 209 Md. 399, 121 A.2d 203
(1956); Graeber v. Anderson, 237 Minn. 20, 53 N.W.2d 642 (1952); Hunkins v.
Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 86 N.H. 356, 169 A. 3 (1933); Whellkin Coat Co. v. Long
Branch Trust Co., 121 N.JL. 106, 1 A.2d 394 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
'4 See Stupka v. Scheidel, 244 Iowa 442, 56 N.W.2d 874 (1953); Sezzin v. Stark, 187
Md. 241, 49 A.2d 742 (1946); Rowe v. Ayer & Williams, Inc., 86 N.H. 127, 164 A. 761
(1933); Baldwin v. McEldowney, 324 Pa. 399, 188 A. 154 (1936).
15 See American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Jackson, 187 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1951); Security
Bldg. Co. v. Lewis, 127 Colo. 139, 255 P.2d 405 (1953); Anderson v. Reeder, 42 Wash. 2d
45, 253 P.2d 423 (1953). See generally Mallard v. Waldman, 340 Mass. 288, 163 N.E.2d
658 (1960); Tair v. Rock Inv. Co., 139 Ohio St. 629, 41 N.E.2d 867 (1942).
'
6 See, e.g., C. W. Simpson Co. v. Langley, 131 F.2d 869 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Fernandes
v. Medeiros, 325 Mass. 293, 90 N.E.2d 9 (1950); Revell v. Deegan, 192 Va. 428, 65
S.E.2d 543 (1951).
17 See, e.g., Hunter v. Goldstein, 267 Mass. 183, 166 N.E. 577 (1929); Aldrich v. Lane,
126 App. Div. 427, 110 N.Y.S. 897 (1908).
1sSee Carter v Carolina Realty Co., 223 N.C. 188, 25 S.E.2d 553 (1943); Gleason v.
Boehm, 58 N.J.L. 475, 34 A. 886 (Sup. Ct. 1896); Flanagan v. Rosoff, 260 App. Div.
776, 23 N.Y.S.2d 980 (1940); McKinley v. Niedersr., 118 Ohio St. 334, 160 N.E. 850
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sustained as a result of unlighted passageways, 19 stairways,20 or ap-
proaches.21 However, he must furnish illumination if the passageways
are constructed in such a manner as to present special danger 22 or in-
herent pitfalls.23
Many jurisdictions which do not recognize a common law duty on
the landlord to illuminate common areas have, in cases involving in-
jury to persons using such areas, recognized that a duty could be found
where the landlord expressly or impliedly assumed the obligation of
furnishing lights.24 Those jurisdictions reason, however, that once the
obligation is assumed, it may be abandoned by giving reasonable notice
of the intention to discontinue the illumination.20
(1928). See generally Busby v. Silverman, 82 Cal. App. 2d 393, 186 P.2d 442 (1947);
Steel v. Lifland, 265 Mass. 233, 163 N.E. 898 (1928).
The mere presence of a usable electric fixture in such premises does not impose on
the landlord the duty of maintaining the lights. Triggiani v. Olive Oil Soap Co.,
1 N.J. Super. 55, 62 A.2d 153 (Super. Ct. 1948).
The landlord is under no common law duty to light the entryway in an office
building after business hours. Rice v. Goodspeed Real Estate Co., 254 Mich. 49,
235 N.W. 814 (1931).
19See, e.g., White v. Thacker, 89 Ga. App. 656, 80 S.E.2d 699 (1954); Barber v.
Kellogg, 111 S.W.2d 201 (Mo. 1937).
2oSee, e.g., Miller-DuPont, Inc. v. Service, 120 Colo. 131, 208 P.2d 87 (1949);
Thompson v. Franckus, 150 Me. 196, 107 A.2d 485 (1954); Flanagan v. Rosoff, 260
App. Div. 776, 23 N.Y.S.2d 980 (1940).
21See, e.g., Srochi v. Hightower, 57 Ga. App. 322, 195 S.E. 323 (1938); Rodde v.
Noland, 281 Mass. 493, 183 N.E. 741 (1933); Gordon v. Stone, 219 App. Div. 201,
219 N.Y.S. 553 (1927).
22 See Tremblay v. Donnelly, 103 N.H. 498, 175 A.2d 391 (1961); Muller v. Menken,
5 Misc. 444, 26 N.Y.S. 801 (Super. Ct. 1893). See also Petera v. Railway Exch. Bldg.,
42 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. 1931); Carpenter v Scheifele, 134 Misc. 637, 236 N.Y.S. 299 (Sup.
Ct. 1929); Hilsenbeck v. Guhring, 131 N.Y. 674, 30 N.E. 580 (1892).23 See generally O'Neil v. Noe, 301 Ky. 472, 192 S.W.2d 366 (1946); Thompson v.
Franckus, 150 Me. 196, 107 A.2d 485 (1954); Borduk v. Guerrieri, 23 Misc. 2d 520,
198 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Sup. Ct. 1960); McGinnis v. Keylon, 135 Wash. 588, 238 P. 631
(1925).
24See Phillips v. Ray-Jean, Inc., 83 Ga. App. 38, 65 S.E.2d 617 (1951); Fenno v.
Roberts, 327 Mass. 305, 98 N.E.2d 611 (1951); Reinagel v. Walnut Residence Co.,
239 Mo. App. 701, 194 S.W.2d 229 (1946); Pitaresi v. Appello, 17 N.J. Super. 278,
85 A.2d 829 (County Ct. 1952); Rietzel v. Cary, 66 R.I. 418, 19 A.2d 760 (1941);
Agosta v. Granite City Real Estate Co., 116 Vt. 526, 80 A.2d 534 (1951).
Where an owner of a tenement building agreed that each tenant should light his
own hallway, he did not impliedly assume the obligation to light the hallways. Brodsky
v. Fine, 263 Mass. 51, 160 N.E. 335 (1928).
25 See Steele v. Lifland, 265 Mass. 233, 163 N.E. 898 (1928); Triggiani v. Olive Oil
Soap Co., 12 N.J. Super. 227, 79 A.2d 471 (Super. Ct. 1951); Lyons v. Lich, 145 Ore.
606, 28 P.2d 872 (1934).
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In contrast, the statutes and ordinances of other jurisdictions place
on the landlord the duty to light common passageways, stairways and
approaches during particular hours, 20 or require that lights be provided
in common areas of multiple dwelling houses. 27 This statutory duty im-
posed on the landlord is not satisfied by the mere maintenance of a
28an thlight controlled by the tenant, and the landlord is liable for personal
injuries sustained as a result of his failure to comply with regulations
requiring him to light common areas.2
The remaining jurisdictions impose a responsibility on the landlord,
independent of contract or statute, to illuminate common areas as a
part of his general duty 3° to use reasonable care to keep those segments
of the premises under his control in a safe condition.3' These decisions
indicate that liability for injuries to a tenant or other claiming under
him should not depend on the portion of the building or premises
2 6 See, e.g., Harris v. Joffe, 28 Cal. 2d 418, 170 P.2d 454 (1946); Maitz v. Lulewicz,
133 Conn. 355, 51 A.2d 595 (1947); Demeter v. Rosenberg, 114 N.J.L. 55, 175 A. 621
(Sup. Ct. 1934).
The landlord's duty to one rightfully on the premises is to exercise reasonable care
to comply with the statute. Liability for such injuries is based on evidence that the
landlord has been actively negligent in causing the absence of lights or passively
negligent in failing to supply lights or to correct their failure after having actual or
constructive notice thereof. Busby v. Silverman, 82 Cal. App. 2d 393, 186 P.2d 442
(1947).
27 See Reider v. Whitebrook Realty Corp., 23 App. Div. 2d 691, 257 N.Y.S.2d 635
(1965).
The term "light," as used in the statute requiring the owner of a tenement or
lodging house to keep a light burning in the hallway between certain hours, means an
artificial light, such as is furnished by a lamp, a jet of illuminated gas, or some form
of apparatus employed to illuminate buildings by means of electricity. Bretsch v.
Plate, 82 App. Div. 399, 81 N.Y.S. 868 (1903).
28 See, e.g., Gibson v. Hoppman, 108 Conn. 401, 143 A. 635 (1928).
29 See generally Rio v. Rio, 22 Conn. Supp. 181, 164 A.2d 546 (Super. Ct. 1960);
Webb v. Betta, 7 NJ. Super. 60, 71 A.2d 897 (Super. Ct. 1950); Salomon v. Timpson
Place Constr. Corp., 166 Misc. 506, 2 N.Y.S.2d 718 (City Ct. 1938).
This duty imposed on the landlord by statute requires him to exercise reasonable
care and diligence. Roth v. Protos, 120 N.J.L. 502, 1 A.2d 10 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
The courts have neither the power, privilege, nor the right to expand the landlord's
duty to maintain lighting in stairways and public halls of his building beyond the period
prescribed by statute. Adamo v. De-Mar Realty Corp., 207 Misc. 262, 137 N.Y.S.2d
281 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
30 See Kay v. Cain, 154 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Smeriglio v. Connecticut Say.
Bank, 129 Conn. 461, 29 A.2d 443 (1942); Beitch v. Mishkin, 184 Pa. Super. 120, 132
A.2d 703 (1957).31 See Panama Canal Co. v. Wagner, 234 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1956); Kay v. Cain, 154
F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Wade v. Yale Univ., 129 Conn. 615, 30 A.2d 545 (1943).
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where the defective condition exists, but on the fact that the landlord
has retained control over the common area.32
When a person rightfully on the premises discovers a common area
in darkness, he may assume the risk or become contributorily negligent
in dealing with it. It is generally recognized that proceeding in the dark
requires greater care than doing so in the light.3 3 However, this rule
is consistent with the general proposition that one is required to exer-
cise ordinary care, 34 reasonable care,'35 or prudence 3, under the circum-
stances for his own safety.
Several jurisdictions have set forth special rules as to proceeding in
darkness constituting contributory negligence. Some courts have ob-
served that it is contributory negligence per se.3" Generally, however,
proceeding in a dark area is not inherently negligent,38 and the issue is
32See Kay v. Cain, 154 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Hariston v. Washington Housing
Corp., 45 A.2d 287 (D.C. App. 1946); Iverson v. Quam, 226 Minn. 290, 32 N.W.2d
596 (1948); Hoss v. Nestor B. & L. Ass'n, 164 Pa. Super. 77, 63 A.2d 435 (1949). See
generally Phillips v. Capital Inv. & Guar. Co., 32 A.2d 249 (D.C. App. 1942); Sodekson
v. Lynch, 298 Mass. 72, 9 N.E.2d 372 (1937).
33 See Skladzien v. W.M. Sutherland Bldg. & Constr. Co., 101 Conn. 340, 125 A. 614
(1924); Johnson v. Goodier, 182 Neb. 172, 153 N.W.2d 445 (1967); Coxey v. Guala,
112 Pa. Super. 460, 171 A. 484 (1934); Presser v. Siesel Constr. Co., 19 Wis. 2d 54, 119
N.W.2d 405 (1963).
34 See Holliday v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 314 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1963); Bridger v.
Gresham, 111 Ga. 814, 35 S.E. 677 (1900); Jewell v. Blanchett Inv. Co., 199 Minn. 267,
271 N.W. 461 (1937); Bragg v. Smilowitz, 16 App. Div. 2d 181, 226 N.Y.S.2d 755
(1962).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court of Appeals has applied the following rules in dark
interior stairway cases: (1) where a person proceeds in absolute darkness without
reasonable necessity, he is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law; and
(2) where there is a fairly compelling reason for walking in a place which is dark, but
not completley devoid of light, the question of contributory negligence is determined
by the jury. Hall v. Glick, 177 Pa. Super. 546, 110 A.2d 836 (1955).
35See Dunn v. Sammett, 335 Mass. 162, 138 N.E.2d 576 (1956); Selby v. McWilliams
Realty Corp., 246 Miss. 568, 151 So. 2d 596 (1963); Bender v. White, 199 Wash. 510,
92 P.2d 268 (1939).
36 See Crowell v. Middletown Say. Bank, 122 Conn. 362, 189 A. 172 (1937);
Eggert v. Mutual Grocery Co., 111 N.J.L. 502, 168 A. 312 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933);
Jones v. Moran Bros. Co., 45 Wash. 391, 88 P. 626 (1907).
3 7 Whelan v. Van Natta, 382 S.W.2d 205 (Ky. 1964); Brown v. Associated Operating
Co., 165 App. Div. 702, 151 N.Y.S. 531 (1915) (unless one is constrained, induced or
in an emergency); Chardon Lakes Inn Co. v. Mac Bride, 56 Ohio App. 40, 10 N.E.2d
9 (1937).
38 See, e.g., Packard v. Kennedy, 4 Ill. App. 2d 177, 124 N.E.2d 55 (1955); Huyink v.
Hart Publications, Inc., 212 Minn. 87, 2 N.W7.2d 552 (1942); Chardon Lakes Inn Co.
v. Mac Bride, 56 Ohio App. 40, 10 N.E.2d 9 (1937).
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solely a question of law only when the plaintiff's negligence is so
clearly established that reasonable minds can reach no other conclusion. 9
Under the "step in the dark" rule, one is contributorily negligent as a
matter of law when, in the absence of an emergency, without first
determining where he is going and the obstructions to his safe progress,
he proceeds in an unfamiliar situation while the darkness renders the
use of eyesight ineffective.40 Courts have emphasized the plaintiff's
familiarity with the place he ventured.4 It is ordinarily contributory
negligence to proceed into a darkened and unfamiliar place,42 especially
where another known course of travel is available.43 The failure to ob-
tain or turn on a light, or to take other precautions is not necessarily
contributory negligence, although under certain circumstances such
failure could amount to negligence.44
When one proceeds in darkness in the face of hazards he should
reasonably expect to encounter, Virginia, in several cases, has held it
to be contributory negligence as a matter of law.45 Thus, when a fe-
39 See Keech v. Clements, 303 Mich. 69, 5 N.W.2d 570 (1942); Walters v. Harris,
250 N.C. 701, 110 S.E.2d 283 (1959).4 0 Rohrbacher v. Gillig, 203 N.Y. 413, 96 N.E. 733 (1911); see Maher v. Voss, 48 Del.
45, 98 A.2d 499 (1953); Delaney v. Breeding's Homestead Drug Co., 93 So. 2d 116 (Fla.
1957); Mattox v. Atlanta Enterprises, Inc., 91 Ga. App. 847, 87 S.E.2d 432 (1955);
Curet v. Hiern, 95 So. 2d 699 (La. App. 1957); Malmquist v. Leeds, 245 Minn. 130,
71 N.W.2d 863 (1955); Tryba v. Fray, 75 Nev. 288, 339 P.2d 753 (1959).
41See Robinson v. King, 113 Cal. App. 2d 455, 248 P.2d 477 (1952); Palmer v.
Boston Penny Say. Bank, 301 Mass. 540, 17 N.E.2d 899 (1938); Iverson v. Quam, 226
Minn. 290, 32 N.W.2d 596 (1948). See generally Dively v. Penn-Pittsburgh Corp.,
332 Pa. 65, 2 A.2d 831 (1938).
4 2 See Donnelly v. Larkin, 327 Mass. 287, 98 N.E.2d 280 (1951); Panoff v. Anrob
Realty Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 774, 228 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1962); Komlo v. Balazick, 169
Pa. Super. 296, 82 A.2d 706 (1951).4 3 See, e.g., Panoff v. Anrob Realty Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 774, 228 N.Y.S.2d 329
(1962).
4 4 See Burk v. Corrado, 116 Conn. 511, 165 A. 682 (1933); Norman v. Shulman,
150 Fla. 142, 7 So. 98 (1942); Crider v. Duvall, 228 Md. 513, 180 A.2d 693 (1962); Rado
v. Zlotnick, 7 N.J. Super. 197, 72 A.2d 533 (Super. Ct. 1950); Yarbrough v. Smith,
66 Wash. 2d 365,402 P.2d 667 (1965).
4 Smith v. Wiley-Hall Motors, Inc., 184 Va. 49, 34 S.E.2d 233 (1945); Baker v.
Butterworth, 119 Va. 402, 89 S.E. 849 (1916); Reed v. Richmond & Alleghany R.R.,
84 Va. 231, 4 S.E. 587 (1887).
An exculpatory clause providing that the lessor would not be liable to the "[t]enant,
his family ... or invitees for any damages to person or property arising from any
cause whatsoever" did not relieve the landlord from liability resulting from his negli-
gence in the maintenance of a common doorway. Taylor v. Virginia Constr. Corp.,
209 Va. 76, 161 S.E.2d 732 (1968).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [
male passenger who alighted from a train, wandered from the waiting
room onto the elevated platform, which was unlighted because the
lamp was being repaired, and fell, she was held to be contributorily
negligent.46 A guest in a hotel who undertook to go to the lavatory
down an unlighted corridor without having requested a light was held
to have negligently contributed to her own injury when she fell down
a stairway.47 Similarly, a motorist, who was looking for a restroom in
a gasoline station and made no inquiry about its location, was held to be
contributorily negligent when he ventured into an unlighted room and
fell into a grease pit.
48
A person is seldom deemed to have "assumed the risk" in proceed-
ing into darkened premises.49 Generally, knowledge of the peril and
an appreciation of the danger are indispensable to an assumption of the
risk result.50
In Knight v. Fourth Buckingham Community, Inc.,51 the wife of the
lessee, on returning to her apartment, encountered darkness in the hall
and stairway where the landlord normally maintained illumination. The
plaintiff fell and sustained an injury while approaching her dwelling.
The court affirmed a demurrer in favor of the lessor and noted that no
statute in Virginia required that the landlord maintain artificial lights
in areas under his control and "in this jurisdiction the common law
prevails." 52
The rationale of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Knight
is inconsistent with its decisions applying the universal requirement that
a landlord must exercise reasonable care to maintain that portion of
the premises used in common by himself and tenants in a safe condi-
4 6 Reed v. Richmond & Allehany R.R., 84 Va. 231, 4 S.E. 587 (1887).
4 7 Baker v. Butterworth, 119 Va. 402, 89 S.E. 849 (1916).
48 Smith v. Wiley-Hall Motors, Inc., 184 Va. 49, 34 S.E.2d 233 (1945).
49 See generally Rodgers v. Stoller, 284 Ky. 108, 143 S.W.2d 1047 (1940); Heinberg v.
Sikora Realty Corp., 110 Misc. 323, 180 N.Y.S. 405 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
50 See City of Winona v. Botzet, 169 F. 321 (8th Cir. 1909); Brant v. Van Zandt, 77
So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1954); Sodekson v. Lynch, 314 Mass. 161, 49 N.E.2d 901 (1943);
Coenen v. Buckrman Bldg. Corp., 278 Minn. 193, 153 N.W.2d 329 (1967); Plotkin v.
Meeks, 131 Ohio St. 493, 3 N2E.2d 404 (1936); Berry v. Hamman, 203 Va. 596, 125
S.E.2d 851 (1962); Davis v. Sykes, 202 Va. 952, 121 S2E.2d 513 (1961); Kelenic v.
Berndt, 185 'Vis. 240, 201 N.W. 250 (1924).
51 179 Va. 13, 18 S.E.2d 264 (1942).
52 Id. at 16, 18 S.E.2d at 265.
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tion.53 The conceptual analysis used by the Virginia court which estab-
lished the lessor's duty in regard to hallways,
5 4 stairways, 55 porches,56
entrances,67 frozen plumbinge s and the occasional presence of ice on an
exterior common area, 59 is apropos to the ever-present peril of dark-
ness.
When the landlord has control and possession of areas used in com-
mon by occupants of the premises and by others having lawful oc-
casion to be present, there is imposed upon him the duty to maintain
the premises in a safe condition, which necessarily implies a duty to
furnish artificial illumination. Notwithstanding the fact that the rules
as to contributory negligence are applicable, an owner of rented prem-
53Taylor v. Virginia Constr. Corp., 209 Va. 76, 161 S.E.2d 732 (1968); Paytan v.
Rowland, 208 Va. 24, 155 S.E.2d 36 (1967); Langhorne Road Apts., Inc. v. Bission,
207 Va. 474, 150 S.E.2d 540 (1966); Wagman v. Boccheciampe, 206 Va. 412, 143 S.E.2d
907 (1965); City of Richmond v. Grizzard, 205 Va. 298, 136 S.E.2d 827 (1964);
Revell v. Deegan, 192 Va. 428, 65 S.E.2d 543 (1951); Williamson v. Wellman, 156
Va. 417, 158 S.E. 777 (1931); Beriln v. Wall, 122 Va. 425, 95 S.F. 394 (1918).
54 City of Richmond v. Grizzard, 205 Va. 298, 136 S.E.2d 827 (1964); Berlin v. Wall,
122 Va. 425, 95 S.E. 394 (1918).
55 Revell v. Deegan, 192 Va. 428, 65 S.E.2d 543 (1951); see Wagman v. Boccheciampe,
206 Va. 412, 143 S.E.2d 907 (1965); Oliver v. Cashin, 192 Va. 540, 65 S.E.2d 571 (1951).
In Wagman a five-year old child sought recovery for injuries sustained while playing
on an outside stairway maintained by the defendants for the common use of their
tenants. An expert testified that the stairway was not safe for children's play. However,
the court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff holding that a landlord is under a duty
to keep those portions of the premises under his control safe for the purpose for which
they are intended to be used, and he is under no duty to keep them safe for all
purposes for which they might be used. Furthermore, the landlord is under no duty to
police the area to prevent children from playing in a known dangerous place or notify
the parents of those children.
A provision in the lease stated that "children will not be permitted to play in
public halls or on the lawns or entrance steps, or walks of the building." This provision
should have resulted in the plaintiff being a trespasser as to the stairway and railing,
and the defendants should have been liable for the injury to the infant, assuming
the burden of eliminating the danger was minimal as compared with the risk to the
child, and also assuming that a five-year old could not realize the risk involved. See
RESTAT ENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 339 (1965).
50 Paytan v. Rowland, 208 Va. 24, 155 SZE.2d 36 (1967).
5
'Taylor v. Virginia Constr. Corp., 209 Va. 76, 161 S.E.2d 732 (1968); Oliver v.
Cashin, 192 Va. 540, 65 S.E.2d 571 (1951); Williamson v. Wellman, 156 Va. 417, 158
S.E. 777 (1931).
58Jacobs v. Carter, 154 Va. 87, 152 S.E. 332 (1930); Hunter-Smith Co. v. Gibson,
119 Va. 582, 87 S.E. 886 (1916).
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ises must be required to light entrance approaches, stairways, and com-
mon passages in multiple dwellings after sunset or at any other time
when there is an absence of illumination. The proposition effectuated
by the Virginia court to support the lessor's responsibility in regard
to other dangers should apply with tantamount force to the intermittent
hazard of darkness.
E.L. C.
